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The EMPA and parliamentary diplomacy in the Mediterranean: a 
preliminary assessment 
Stelios STAVRIDIS 8: Roderick PACE 
1. I ntr od uction 
The literature on Euro-Mediterranean relations is extensive, but most analysts 
agree that even in its current phase the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/EMP, 
also known as the Barcelona Process 1 has fallen short of its admittedly 
ambitious objectives as set out in the Catalan capital in November 1995. This 
pessimistic assessment is confirmed by several studies published on the occasion 
of the 10th anniversary of the EMP, whose official celebration was marred by a 
boycott by numerous Arab leaders.2 
In a number of ministerial meetings held during 2008, President Sarkozy's 
original proposal for a "Mediterranean Union" underwent several changes. In 
March 2008 the European Council endorsed the basic principles of "the 
Barcelona Process-Union for the Mediterranean" which would comprise all the 
EU member states and the states of the Mediterranean littoral who already 
participate in the EMP. At the July Mediterranean states Paris meeting the idea 
continued to be clarified and then in November, EMP Foreign Ministers meeting 
in Marseilles trimmed its rather bombastic title down to "Union for the 
Mediterranean" and gave it what appears to be a more concrete direction. 
Whichever way one may look at these events, there is one inescapable 
conclusion: they show to a large extent an open admission of the need to 
reinvigorate the flagging EMP. 3 
1 As of late 2008 the EMP, renamed Union for the Mediterranean, consists of 43 member states (42 
countries plus the Palestinian Authority). The initial 1995 EMP launched a Process between on the 
one hand the EU and its 15 member states, and on the other 12 Southern Mediterranean states. 
With the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, the EU side now consists of 27 members (Cyprus and Malta 
moved from Southern Mediterranean states to EU members) , and the South now includes the 10 
remaining ones plus Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Monaco and Mauritania. 
Libya enjoys an observer status. 
2 For an overview see Stelios Stavridis, 'The Barcelona Process, twelve years on: a critical 
overview', Agora without Frontiers - A Quarterly Journal of International Economy and Politics, 
Vol. 13, No.4, March-May 2008, pp 243-261. 
3 On the Sarkozy proposal, see inter alia Gonzalo Escribano and Alejandro Lorca, La Union 
Mediteminea: una union en busCG de proyecto, Royal Institute Elcano DT N" 1312008-03/03/2008, 
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Among the many criticisms levelled at the Barcelona Process, some stress the 
lack of economic progress and development in the region, while others focus on 
the non-convergence of interests and identities. There is also harsh criticism of 
its complete inability to achieve progress on a common security charter. 
Similarly, tough criticism is levelled at the stunted democratisation process in 
the Southern Mediterranean states. With the partial exceptions of Turkey and 
Israel, the Mashrek and Maghreb countries are consistently and harshly criticised 
for huge democratic deficits4. It is therefore possible (sadly) to agree with a 
cousin of the King of Morocco when he says that: "Les regimes arabes 
modernisent '" l' autoritarisme". 5 
Furthermore, the Mediterranean region is almost synonymous with 'conflicts,6. 
Therefore, it would appear that it represents an 'ideal' case for assessing the 
impact of parliamentary diplomacy, especially within the deeply 
institutionalised context of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary 
Assembly/EMPA (see below). 
In that context, can parliamentary diplomacy act as a force for conflict 
resolution in the Mediterranean? As David Beetham has noted, '[t]he cessation 
of regional conflict is the first imperative for regional parliamentary dialogue' 7. 
Madrid: www.realinstitutoelcano.org; ISS Report, Union for the Mediterranean-Building on the 
Barcelona acquis, European Union Institute for Security Studies Report No.1 (Roberto Aliboni, 
George Joffe, Erwan Lannon, Azzam Mahjoub, Abdallah Saaf, Alvaro de Vasconcelos), Paris, 13 May 
2008; Euromesco, Putting the Mediterranean Union in Perspective, Euromesco Report No. 68 
(Roberto Aliboni, Ahmed Driss, Tobias Schumacher, Alfred Tovias), June 2008: www.euromesco.net; 
Dorothee Schmid, The Union far the Mediterranean: French Track ar New European Policy, The 
Jean Monnet Seminar Series, Malta European Studies Association &: European Documentation Centre, 
University of Malta, 2008; Escribano and Lorca (this volume); Khader (this volume); Risi (this 
volume). On the new Secretariat, see Sami Na'ir, 'Barcelona, capital euro-meditemlnea', EI Pais, 
16 October 2008. See also the EI Pais editorial on 7 November 2008 which welcomed the decision, 
entitled 'Barcelona-Med, La dinamizaci6n de la Uni6n Mediteminea necesitaba una sede estable 
como la elegida' . 
4 Marina Ottaway and Julia Choucair-Vizoso (eds), Beyond the Fa,ade: Political Reform in the Arab 
World, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008. See also the 2007 Freedom House Index 
of Political Rights and Civil Liberties: http://www . freedomhouse .org/uploads/Chart116File163. pdf 
(accessed 15.08.08). See also' Los paises arabes, a la zaga de la educaci6n en el Tercer Mundo', El 
Pais (6 February 2008) reproducing information from a recent World Bank report 
(www.bancomundial.org). 
5 Hicham Ben Abdallah El Alaoui, Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2008, pp 10-11. 
6 see Paul Balta, 'La Mediterranee en tant que zone de conflits', Revista C!DOB d'Afers 
Internacionals, Vol. 37, 1997, pp 9-18. 
7 David Beetham, Parliament and Democracy in the Twenty-first Century: A Guide to Good 
Practice, Interparliamentary Union, 2006: www.ipu.org.p.11. 
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In other words, parliamentarians are expected to reach where governmental 
actors cannot reach8 . To quote Beetham again: 
'A diplomat is an envoy of the executive branch and represents the 
positions of the State. Members of parliament, however, are politicians 
who hold political beliefs which mayor may not coincide with their 
respective country's official position on any given issue. This allows 
parliamentarians a margin of flexibility that is denied to the diplomat. 
They tend to bring a moral dimension to international politics that 
transcends narrow definitions of the national interest, particularly in 
their principled support for democracy and human rights. Time and 
again we have seen that this flexibility allows parliamentarians to 
debate more openly with their counterparts from other countries and to 
advance innovative solutions to what may seem to be intractable 
problems' .9 
For instance, Alain Berset of Switzerland's Council of States (i.e. Senate) 
reminds us that 'the first contact between the British and the Argentinians 
after the Falklands War took place within the Inter-Parliamentary Union', 
addin g further that a 'meeting between North and South Korean parliamentary 
representatives [also took place) within the framework of this same 
organisation, which also set up a meeting of Israeli and Palestinian 
parliamentary representatives ( ... ) , 10. 
Although sometimes traditional diplomats consider parliamentarians as 
'parasiting' their own work11 , this is a rather old-fashioned approach that does 
not necessarily reflect the reality of international relations in the 21st century. 
It goes without saying that it is also possible for parliamentarians to 'respecter 
un devoir de reserve', to use the words of Xavier de Villepin, then President of 
the French Senate's Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armies Committee 12. 
Moreover, any critical approach tends to ignore the (potential or real) benefits 
of parallel channels, which represents a constant alternative or addition to 
traditional diplomatic practice. 
8 Abdelwahab Biad, 'lPuede la institucionalizacion de una dimension parlamentaria dinamizar el 
Partenariado Euromediterraneo?', Med.2005, IEMedlinstituto Europeo del Mediterraneo and CIDOB, 
Barcelona, 2005, pp 110·113: www.cidob.org, p. 112. 
9 Beetham (2006), op. cit. (emphasis added). For more details, see also Roderick Pace and Stelios 
Stavridis, 'The EMPA, 2004·2008: Assessing the first four years of the parliamentary dimension of 
the Barcelona Process', Mediterranean Quarterly (2009, in press). 
10 Proceedings of the European Conference of Presidents of Parliaments in Tallinn (Estonia) on 30· 
31 May 2006, p. 48. 
11 . un parasitage dans les negotiations' to use the words of Gerard Davet and Pascal Ceaux, . Le 
cas Julia', Le Monde, 09.03.05: www.lemonde.fr. 
12 Senat, La diploma tie parlementaire, Actes du Colloque, French Senate, Paris, 2001: 
www.senaUr (17.08.05), p.16. 
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This chapter consists of four parts: 
• Part One briefly looks at the EMP, in order to put this study within its 
wider context. 
• Part Two presents an overview of relevant developments at the 
parliamentary level of the EMP, namely its Parliamentary 
Assembly IEMPA. 13 
• Part Three analyzes three empirical case-studies of conflictual 
situations: the Middle East, the Western Sahara, and Cyprus. It will 
consider what contribution, if any, has the EMPA made to conflict 
resolution with regard to these three specific examples? 
• Finally, Part Four touches briefly a number of related issues to 
parliamentary diplomacy, such as parliamentary input in election 
monitoring; the parliaments' contribution to the so-called 
'socialization effect'; their importance as 'morale tribunes'; and, the 
role of sub-state parliamentary bodies. 
2. The EMP, regionalism and parliamentarisation 
The EU (previously the European Economic Community IEEC) has been the 
dominant actor in promoting bilateral and to a lesser, though not insignificant 
extent, region-to-region relations in the Mediterranean. In part, this is due to 
the very nature of the Union itself (Europe's regional integration process), and 
in part because it sees itself as a possible model for other regions in the 
world 14• In recent years and especially since 2003, the EU's foreign policy 
agenda has been more 'securitized'. Meanwhile, key EU member states with the 
required capabilities continue to pursue national foreign policy aims in the 
Mediterranean region - just as they do elsewhere whenever the opportunity 
presents itself. 
The inter-regional dimension in the Mediterranean area involves relations 
between, on the one hand, the EU states of the Northern Mediterranean, and on 
the other, the Southern Mediterranean states (basically the Mashrek and the 
Maghreb, but also Turkey and Israel). As was already noted in the Introduction, 
13 For more details, see also Pace and Stavridis (2009), op.cit. 
14 See Carlos Conde, 'ASEAN aims to become more like the EU', International Herald Tribune, 13· 
14 January 2007; Paulo Paranagua, 'L' Amerique du Sud sur les traces de l'UE', Le Monde, 12 June 
2008. For academic studies see inter alia Sebastian Santander, 'The European Partnership with 
MERCOSUR: a Relationship Based on Strategic and Neo-liberal Principles', European Integration, 
Vol. 27, No.3, September 2005, pp. 285-306; Joaquin Roy and Roberto Dominguez (eds), The 
European Union and Regional Integration - A Comparative Perspective and Lessons for the 
Americas, Jean Monnet Chair University of Miami, Miami, 2005; Claudia Beatriz Umana, Integracion 
centroamericana: un proyecto en proceso de construccion, ARI Paper No. 6812008, Real Instituto 
Elcano, Madrid, 27 June 2008: www.realinstituto.elcano.org. 
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most of those countries experience a number of democratic deficits, and to 
date the EMP' s record in encouraging the strengthening of democracy in these 
countries is far from being positive, 
But th is chapter does not deal with the EMP as such, Indeed, the EU' s foreign 
affairs in several of the regions of the world have for several reasons also 
included a parliamentary dimension (see below), In the Euro-Mediterranean 
context, the European Parliament has played an important role in establishing 
such a parliamentary dimension, Of course this development is related to a 
global trend of a gradually expanding and deepening of international 
parliamentary co-operation. One important way through which parliaments 
engage in regionalism is via the setting up of International Parliamentary 
Assemblies, usually of a formal and highly institutionalised manner, based on 
written statutes and rules of procedures 15, Three developments have been 
identi1ied16 : 
their expansion in the last sixty years; 
the geographic spread of this type of organisation; 
their affiliation to intergovernmental organisations. 
Regional parliamentarization is expressed through the work of 
interparliamentary organs established within the framework of regional 
organisations. Parliamentary assemblies create a direct link between the 
national and the international decision-making levels. 
Though (inter)parliamentarisation is by definition a formal, elite-driven process 
(i.e. engaging national or regional parliaments), its agenda reflects a new 
approach to regionalism: it does not merely involve cooperation among 
parliaments or parliamentary diplomacy, but it aims to strengthen other 
elements such as the involvement of civil society and non-state actors. It is 
multi-dimensional and comprehenSive, as well as an open form of regionalism. 
At the same time, the existing literature has so far mainly linked parliaments 
with regionalism focusing on its impact on democratization. Thus, Alex Warleigh 
argues that '[r]egional integration can be a force for (liberal) 
15 See Robert Cutler, 'The OSCE's Parliamentary Diplomacy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus 
in Comparative Perspective', Studia Diplomatica - Brussels Jaurnal of International Relations, Vol. 
LlX, No.2, 2006, pp 79-93; Zlatko Sabic, 'Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: 
The Role of International Parliamentary Institutions', Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 61, No.2, 2008, pp 
255-271. 
16 Stefan Marschall, 'European Parliaments in Transnational Organisations: Parliamentary 
Cooperation beyond the European Union', Paper prepared for the SWP Conference 'Fifty Years of 
Interparliamentary Cooperation', 13 June 2007, Berlin. 
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democratisation,17. But we equally agree when he says that 'it is rare outside 
the literature on the EU to find regional integration studies that focus on 
democracy as a key issue>18, except in Latin America. 
from the above, it becomes clear that the main reason for engaging in in 
(inter)regional cooperation is to achieve peace and democracy which also seems 
to be the main objective of many regional integration schemes, foremost among 
them the European one. These two objectives are at the core of many such 
processes, even when economics are the means used to that end. The European 
example, of targeting political union by means of functional co·operation and 
economic integration propelled forward by the "spill over" effect, has been 
well-documented. Similarly, other regional integration projects stress the 
importance of multiple regional interdependencies, precisely by encouraging 
economic integration, as a way of strengthening long-term political stability. 
Their long-term objective confirms this point. For instance, ASEAN (the 
Association of South-Eastern Asia Nations) was set up as a means to contain 
communism in Asia only to emerge later as an economic bloc with a growing 
political agenda (human rights, anti-terrorism). 
If democracy and democratisation are so important for integration studies and 
for New Regionalism (which is discussed briefly below), then the importance of 
its parliamentary dimension is almost automatic. That is to say, that one clear 
impact of regionalisation can be seen in the growth of (inter)regional 
parliamentarization. Modern democracies, or constellations of democracies, 
need parliamentary legitimisation. This is clearly the case in parliamentary 
democracies as found in Europe, but also in democratic presidential systems of 
government such as those in Latin America 19. Most, if not all, organisations 
nowadays need to offer some sort of legitimacy. As a result, all regional 
integration arrangements include (sometimes only later on in their 
development) a parliamentary dimension. 
In recent years, the International Relations literature has built on the eXisting 
literature on regionalism and regionalisation. This so-called' New Regionalism' 
contends that following the end of the Cold-War and the collapse of the Soviet 
empire, there is a process of Globalisation that has led to a new form of 
17 Alex Warleigh, 'In Defence of Intra-disciplinarity: "European Studies", the "New Regionalism", 
and the Issue of Democratisation', Cambridge Review of International Affairs, July, Vol.17, No.2, 
pp 301-318, p.310 
18 Ibid., p. 309. 
19 Andres Malamud and Luis de Sousa, Regional Parliaments in Europe and Latin America: Between 
Empowerment and Irrelevance, paper presented to the First Global International Studies 
Conference, World International Studies Committee, Bilgi University, Istanbul, 24-27 August 2005: 
www.iscte.pt. 
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Regionalism2o . It is within this wider context of traditional regionalism, New 
Regionalism, and inter-regional cooperation, that this chapter will address a 
specific question from a particular angle: whether parliamentary cooperation 
can act as a tool for conflict resolution in the Mediterranean region and in this 
way el1courage the growth of a deeper regionalism? 
3. The EMPA 
Intern .. tional inter-parliamentary cooperation in the Mediterranean has a long 
histor~, starting with the International Parliamentary Union (IPU)21. Euro-
Mediterranean parliamentary cooperation as such has developed within the 
1995 Barcelona Process, initally as the EMP Parliamentary Forum (1998-2003), 
and from 2004 onwards as the EMPA22 . Institutionalised inter-parliamentary 
cooperation shows that the international relations of parliamentary bodies have 
developed much further than 'just' technical, financial and training 
cooperation, most of which are related to the consolidation of 'the 
constitutional state, enhancing the proper functioning of democratic 
institutions through the improvement of the parliamentary work' 23. 
We need to stress at this stage that here we are focusing almost exclusively on 
the parliamentary dimension of the Barcelona Process. There is a plethora of 
other parliamentary actors in the Mediterranean. But the EMPA remains the 
most developed and institutionalised parliamentary framework if only because 
the EMP represents the culmination of various decades of Euro-Mediterranean 
relations. As noted above, the evolution of the EMPA has also benefited a lot 
from the establishment of the EMP Parliamentary Forum (EMPF) a body which 
lasted from 1998 until 200324. Therefore EU-Mediterranean relations, and EU 
relations with the Mediterranean countries at the parliamentary level, do have 
some long pedigree. 
20 see inter alia Bjorn Hettne, 'The New Regionalism Revisited', in Soderbaum, Fedrik and Shaw, 
Timothy (eds), Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2003, pp 
22-42. 
21 The IPU's website is: www.ipu.org. 
22 The EMPA' s website is: www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/empa/default.htm. 
23 from the French Senate programme for EU candidate states parliaments: Technical Parliamentary 
Cooperation, French Senate: www.senat.fr/internationallenglish/coop.html (accessed 19.02.08). In 
terms of how to transmit their know-how, the French Senate organises the following three 
activities: missions abroad; interns and delegations visits and stays in Paris; follow-up activities. At 
the UN level, just as one of many other possible examples, its' Division for Sustainable Development 
provides targeted advisory services at the request of individual governments. These services support 
specific policy initiatives and the requisite institutional development and capacity-building'. It is 
based on . the strength of its parliamentary, analytical and technical co-operation work'. UN 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Technical Cooperation: 
www.un.org/esa/sustdev/tech_coop/tech_coop.htm (accessed 19.02.08). 
24 see Stelios Stavridis, 'The Parliamentary Forum of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: an 
assessment', Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 7, No.2, Summer 2002, pp 30-53. 
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Up to Uanuary 2009, the EMPA consists of a maximum of 260 members who meet 
in plenary session once a year (and more if need be). There are 130 European 
parliamentarians (S1 from the national parliaments of EU member states and 49 
fIIEPs from the European Parliament) and another 130 come from the 
parliaments of the Southern Mediterranean states. There are now four 
permanent committees and one ad hoc Committee (initially there were three 
permanent ones and one ad hoc): 
o The Committee on Political Affairs, Security and Human Rights 
o The Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs, Social Affairs and 
Education 
o The Committee on Improving the Quality of Life, Exchanges between 
Civil Societies and Culture 
o The Committee on Woman's Rights (for the first four years, it was only 
an ad hoc Committee) 
o The ad hoc Committee on Energy and Environment (agreed in March 
200S). 
f\ number of working groups have also been established: 
· Peace and Security in the Middle East 
· Financing of the Assembly and revision of the EMPA's Rules of Procedure 
· The Problem of land mines 
· Conditions for the transformation of the FEMIP in the Euro-Mediterranean 
Development Bank 
· Civil protection and prevention of natural and ecological disasters in the Euro-
Mediterranean region 
· Ways for the EMPA Assembly to participate in bodies of the Anna Lindh 
Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures25 • 
We can mention inter alia that the huge number of specific EMP projects and 
intitiatives (as well as their important institutional framework that includes the 
Parliamentary Assembly) mean that, not withstanding the disappointments of 
the Barcelona Process, relations among the states of the whole of the Euro-
Mediterranean basin are gradually becoming more and more intertwined and 
interdependent. 
Thus, the parliamentary dimension of the Barcelona Process is: 
[i] adding a level of legitimisation to the process, 
[ii] providing a parliamentary context, 
[iii] and, contributing to a sense of common regional belonging. 
25 For more details, see Pace and Stavridis (2009), op. cit. 
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What d()es the existing literature have to say about the EMPA? One must note 
that it remains an under-researched area of academic interest. This is 
underscDred by the few, usually short, analytical studies, which share some 
resemblance to one another because they tend to focus on the many limitations 
of the exercise. However there seems to be consensus that, had the EMPA not 
existed, this institutional structure should be invented 26 • Four main reasons are 
put fOrVIard to justify this point, namely that: 
- parlia Illentary cooperation is useful in situations where traditional diplomacy 
cannot or would not act; this is particularly important in conflict situations. The 
main argument in this case is that it provides a practical tool for parallel or 
complementary diplomacy. 
it represents the parliamentary dimension of the Barcelona Process. 
it tries to redress one of the acknowledged weaknesses of the Barcelona 
Process: its lack of visibility. 
- and, finally parliaments are seen as the legitimizing forces of any regional 
process. 
It goes without saying that these tasks are not mutually exclusive. In this 
chapter, we will focus on the question of parliamentary diplomacy and conflict 
resolutiDn in the Mediterranean, as well as on other related issues. 
26 See Abdelwahab Biad, 'Los parlamentos como nuevos actores del partenariado: hacia una 
diplomacia parlamentaria en el Mediterraneo', Agora-Revisto de Ciencias Sodales, No, 8, 2003, pp 
11·19; Cristina Retta, 'La politica euromediterranea: su dimension parlamentaria en el proceso de 
Barcelona', Agora-Revista de Ciendas Sodales, No.9, 2003, pp 37-51; loannis Seimenis and 
Miltiadis Makriyannis, 'Reinvigorating the Parliamentary Dimension of the Barcelona Process: The 
Establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly' , Mediterranean Quarterly, Spring 
2005, pp 85·105; Stavridis (2002), op, cit., also his 'El futuro de la cooperacion parlamentaria en el 
Mediterraneo: el proceso de Barcelona', Cuadernos Constitudonales de la Cdtedra Fadrique Furi6 
Ceriol, Nos, 38/39, 2002, pp 5·15, From Parliamentary Forum to Parliamentary Assembly in the 
EMP: Does it all Amount to Much Ado About Nothing?, Med Obs/Observatori de politiques 
mediterrimies (IEMed and IUEE/UAB) Working Paper No.2, Barcelona, January 2004: 
www.medobs.net; Stelios Stavridis and Panagiota Manoli, 'Comparing Experiences in Regional 
Parliamentarisation in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea Regions', Agora without Frontiers' A 
Quarterly Journal of International Economy and Politics, Vol, 13, No.4, March-May 2008, pp 262-
291, pp 271-276; Pace and Stavridis (2009), op, cit. 
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3.Parliamentary diplomacy and conflict-resolution in the Mediterranean: 
assessing the impact of the EMPA 
The situation in the Middle East leads to general instability in its immediate 
vicinity, while its shock waves reverberate throughout the Mediterranean 
region. Indeed over the past decades, the Arab-Israeli conflict has led to a 
destabilising arms race in the Middle East affecting all the states of the region. 
This is slowly transforming itself into one involving weapons of mass destruction 
(WMDs). It provides Arab governments with the excuse to retard or oppose 
democratic reforms. It leads to periodic wasteful flareups that lead to the 
disruption of human and economic life in the states involved. In this respect one 
only has to mention the intifadas, the 2006 war in Lebanon and at the time of 
writing (January 2009) Israeli attacks on Gaza. Such flareups also have a 
negative effect on the very volatile price of oil. The Middle East conflict - along 
with the American occupation of Iraq - continue to provide grist to the terrorist 
mill, although it would be wrong to conclude that these are the sole root causes 
of the terrorist phenomenon. The shadow of the conflict hangs over the 
Mediterranean and could be one of the most important factors that strengthen 
the region's often negative image which, amongst other things, also affects 
investment decisions. 27 
The Cyprus Problem continues to weaken relations between the EU/European 
Union28 and Turkey, sometimes also impinging on NATO's compacteness. Thus, 
the Cyprus Problem has often led to confrontations between Greece and Turkey 
in the Aegean. In a seminar on the Cyprus Problem organized in 2004 by the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Lt. Col. Peter Najera, 
Country Director for Greece and Cyprus, Office of the US Secretary of Defence, 
was reported to have said: 
'In military circles, the Cyprus problem is seen as the last major source 
of tension in the Aegean. A settlement in Cyprus will open the 
floodgates for cooperation among the nations of the region in NATO, the 
United Nations, and the U.S.-led global war on terrorism. '29 
On 7 November 2008, the International press reported that Turkey had rejected 
a set of proposals by the EU to unblock planned co-operation of Cyprus with 
NATO. The EU tried to find a solution to a long-lasting row with Turkey over 
27 see also Ana Santos Pinto, 'European Foreign Policy and the Israeli·Palestinian conflict: rhetoric 
versus practices', in Barrinha, Andre (ed), Towards a Global Dimension: EU's Conflict Management 
in the Neighbourhood and Beyond, Funda~ao Friedrich Ebert, Lisbon, 2008, pp 99·112; Peters (this 
volume). 
28 See Stelios Stavridis, La Union Europea y el conflicto chipriota (1974-2006), Editorial Icaria, 
Barcelona, 2008. 
29 http://www. wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.evenCsummary&event_id=115388 
(accessed 27.12.2008). 
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Cypr ~s's participation in NATO-led operations, but Ankara did not accept any of 
Brussels' proposals (according to Gerard Araud, political director of the French 
Fore"ign Ministry, whose country held at that time the EU rotating Presidency). 
Turk~y objects to the participation of Cyprus in NATO operations, as this would 
mean recognising the Republic of Cyprus. This has made EU-NATO co-operation 
under the so called "Berlin Plus" arrangement difficult if not impossible. 
The 'Western Sahara produces turbulence in the Maghreb, and negatively affects 
integration prospects in that sub-region, which is a goal very much desired by 
the EU30 _ 
A close scrutiny of the work of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly 
show. that none of the major conflicts in the region features amongst its 
priorities. This does not mean of course that they are not discussed at various 
leveL I within the EMPA itself, that these conflicts do not exercise any influence 
on the internal workings of the Assembly, or that they are utterly side-tracked. 
It is <llso to be noted that when situations of tension flare up into hot conflict, 
as happened in the case of the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon war, the EMPA has tried to 
exercise a mediating role. In short, though the major security challenges and 
conflicts in the Mediterranean region have from the start been incorporated in 
the aims of the EMPA (i.e. inserted in its genetic code as it were), they have 
purposely been included under the heading of "some of the many issues to be 
discussed" and not as the main ones. It is most likely that this was done in order 
not to preclude dialogue and co-operation in other areas which are unrelated to 
security but which are equally as crucial for the development of the region and 
for tllis reason possess a longer-term stabilising effect. 
As noted above, we will analyze three important conflictual issue-areas because 
of their similarities in their far-reaching negative effect on the region as a 
whole, or on one of its component sub-regions (Eastern and Western 
Mediterranean): the Middle East, the Western Sahara, and the Cyprus Problem. 
The Middle East 
Clearly, it would be a pity - and a great opportunity lost - for the Assembly to 
be bogged down by a discussion of the Middle East Conflict. But then it is odd 
that a Parliamentary Assembly intended to strengthen North-South bonds in the 
30 see Jordi Vaquer i Fanes, 'The European Union and Western Sahara', European Foreign Affairs 
Review, Vol. 9, No.1, 2004, pp 93-113; his 'Espana y el Sahara Occidental: la dimension 
partidista', Revista C!DOB d'Afers Internacionals, Nos. 79-80, diciembre 2007, pp. 125-144, his 
chapter (this volume); Novais Rui, 'The ENP and the Saharwi conflict resolution: doomed to 
failure?', in Barrinha, Andre (ed), Towards a Global Dimension: EU's Conflict Management in the 
Neighbourhood and Beyond, Funda~ao Friedrich Ebert, Lisbon, 2008, pp 85-98; see also Yahia 
2oubir, 'Stalemate in Western Sahara: Ending International Legality', Middle East Policy, Vol. XIV, 
No.4, Winter 2007, pp 158-177. 
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Mediterranean should engage in 'small talk' at the expense of the more serious 
discussion of the real threats to peace and stability in the region. The 
treatment of the Middle East problem within the EMPA may bear an acute 
resemblance with a case of trying to "run with the hare and hunt with the 
hounds". If the issue is prioritised it paralyses all other work in the Assembly; if 
it is side-tracked, the Assembly is justly criticised as a sham. 
Hence, for example, in the priorities which the Hellenic Parliament had set 
itself for the duration of its tenure of the EMPA presidency (March 2007-March 
2008), the Middle East problem was only placed in seventh place, after other 
topics such as 'the dialogue between cultures', environmental and climate 
protection, energy and migration. 
We are not implying that the Greek Presidency had misplaced its priorities. 
After all the agenda reflects the prevalent mood and priorities amongst the 
member delegations based no doubt on their pragmatic assessment of what is 
doable in the short term and what is not. The fact that the Middle East Conflict 
comes after many other issues could also be proof of the way in which it is 
perceived as having a lethal effect on a broader dialogue on a number of 
important issues. The reasoning behind this seems to take this form: if the 'first 
best' cannot be had, i.e_ if a dialogue on the most important conflicts is 
impossible, need we also throwaway the 'second best' namely co-operation in 
other areas where the obstacles are not so insurmountable? Furthermore, the 
Hellenic Presidency of the EMPA proposed as the first point of discussion in the 
Political Affairs Committee "Ways for the Parliaments to contribute to the 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict" _ 31A working group on peace and 
security in the Middle East was established in March 2007 which by July had 
gained recognition within the EMPA as a parliamentary approach to help resolve 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. By the March 2008 Athens EMPA meeting the group was 
already steadily on its feet. 
When the European Parliament assumed the Presidency of the Assembly in 
March 2008, it put the Middle East process at the top of its priorities stating: 
"1_ Peace process in the Middle East: the EMPA should contribute to 
political dialogue in the region, to enhance the implementation of the 
road map and international law. The Bureau could become directly 
involved by organizing regular exchanges of views with Speakers of the 
Parliaments of the parties at stake and with other relevant actors 
(Quartet, Quartet's representative, SG of the League of Arab States, 
etc.). On a case by case basis, these meetings could be opened to all 
31 See "Items of the Committees" on the Greek Presidency website, at http://empa.parliament.gr/ 
(accessed 12.10.07). 
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Committee chairs and to rapporteurs should a topic of interest for their 
work be addressed." 
At the extraordinary EMPA plenary which met in Jordan in October 2008, work 
was divided almost equally between a discussion of the EMPA as the 
parliamentary dimension of the "Union for the Mediterranean" and the Middle 
East Conflict. Hence, it can be concluded that from 2007 onwards the EMPA 
began to focus more on the Arab·lsraeli conflict and to give it more centre 
stage. fhis shift in emphasis also happened at a time when the United States 
was pursuing the Annapolis initiative, which must have surely introduced an 
element of 'competitive interest' in the formula: the EMPA wanted to avoid all 
possible criticism that the Mediterranean's most august parliamentary 
institution was standing helplessly by while Washington ran the Middle East 
show. But when the conflict in Gaza suddenly erupted towards the end of 2008, 
the EMPA was caught off its guard. Meetings of the various committees were 
schedu led towards the end of January 2009 no doubt as a result of prior 
schedu ling in preparation for the next plenary to take place in Brussels in 
March. 
Notwithstanding that the Middle East conflict has only thus been gradually 
brought forward from one of a number of issues to the forefront of the EMPA 
agenda, the discussion of the conflict has paradoxically monopolised most of 
the debate throughout the lifetime of the EMPA. Sometimes it has also 
monopolised and paralysed discussion in committees (besides the political 
committee) where its absence would have allowed members to carry out a more 
rewarding dialogue on socio-economic challenges facing the peoples of the 
region. 
The Western Sahara 
At the first session of the EMPA held in Cairo in 2005, a resolution was approved 
that referred comprehensively to the issues involved in the process and 
instructed its Political Committee to monitor the situation in the Middle East 
and in Cyprus, but the Western Sahara problem was side·stepped never to 
feature again. 32 The exclusion of this conflict, which has bedevilled the politics 
of the Maghreb for so long, fatally wounding the Arab Maghreb Union33 , is very 
hard to explain. Developments on the issue during 2007·2008 have not stirred 
32 Resolution of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly on the assessment of the 
Barcelona Process on the eve of its tenth anniversary adopted on 15 March 2005 in Cairo: 
www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/empa/ committee_poli Ifinal_resolution_cai ro2005_en. pdf 
(accessed 11.10.07). 
33 See for instance, Francis Ghiles, . El Magreb paga el precio de su desunion - El cierre de la 
frontera entre Argelia y Marruecos es un disparate. Los magrebies no tienen otra alternativa que 
abrir las fronteras que les separan y fomentar la libre circulacion de personas, mercancias y 
energia', El Pais, 5 June 2008. 
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the EMPA into action, at least visibly. In April 2007 the UN Security Council 
approved a resolution on the situation in the Western Sahara. 34 Contacts later 
resumed between all the affected parties, primarily involving Morocco, 
Nauritania, Algeria and the POLISARIO and on 1 October 2007, Morocco's 
Ninister of Foreign Affairs signalled to the UN General Assembly the possibility 
of a way out of this quagmire, citing the Moroccan Statute of Autonomy for the 
former Spanish Sahara as a "realistic, applicable and final political solution to a 
regional dispute that hinders the construction of a strong and homogeneous 
Maghreb, interacting with its geopolitical environment. ,,35 Algeria augurs a 
solution to the conflict and hopes the people of the territory will be able to 
'Iote in a "self-determination" referendum. The European Parliament has 
meanwhile frequently condemned human rights violations in the Western 
Sahara. But the EMPA seems to remain blissfully ignorant of a conflict that is at 
the very core of its raison d'etre at a time when new developments may require 
the EMPA's encouragement and involvement. Thus, the March 2008 Final 
Declaration of the Athens Fourth Plenary Session does not mention the conflict 
in the Western Sahara at all, nor does the Final Declaration adopted in Jordan 
in October 2008. 
Cyprus 
Similarly, the long standing Cyprus Problem remains side-lined in the EMPA, 
notwithstanding that it was mentioned in the 2005 Cairo resolution. Again, 
there is no reference whatsoever to that particular conflict in the March 2008 
Final Declaration of the Athens Fourth Plenary Session or the Jordan 
extraordinary session. 
In the report on the activities of the third EMPA Committee presented in Cairo 
in 2005, we find that the Turkish delegation had . asked for the deletion' of a 
reference to Cyprus . as there was no need to discuss this issue in the session' .36 
In the record of the Proceedings it is stated that: 
'The Cypriot Representative wondered why Turkey had asked to delete 
the paragraph on Cyprus, pointing out that a large part of his country is 
occupied by Turkey. He asked for keeping that paragraph which called 
for the respect and promotion of human rights in Cyprus' .37 
34 Security Council Resolution adopted at the SC's 5669th meeting, 30 April 2007, S/RES/1754 
(2007). 
35 Statement by HE Mohamed Benaissa, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the Kingdom 
of Morocco to the 62nd Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 1 October 2007. 
36 First session of the EMPAIPremiere session de {'APEM, Cairo, March 2005, p,33, 
37 Ibid. p, 35, 
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This situation is not new and reflects a long-standing effort by the Turkish 
parliamentary delegation to deflect any potential criticism of its continued 
occupation within the EMPA framework. Thus, as early as the initial 
parliamentarisation of the Process known as the Parliamentary Forum (see 
abov~), a similar incident had taken place when' an addendum by the Cypriot 
dele!ijation complaining that the Forum Final Declaration does not refer to the 
Cyprus Problem because of "the objection of the Turkish delegation (.,,) despite 
repeated calls by several members,,38. 
There was no reference to Cyprus in the 2005 Cairo Final Declaration but in a 
Resolution tabled by the Committee on Political Affairs, Human Rights and 
Security "On the Assessment of the Barcelona Process on the Eve of its Tenth 
AnniYersary", the EMPA instructed the said committee to monitor - among other 
thin!ijs- 'other political problems pertaining to security and neighbourhood 
between partner countries, including the Cyprus issue' .39 The fact that there 
was no direct reference to the Issue but just it being mentioned as one of many 
problems in the Mediterranean confirms this lack of attention to the Problem. 
What is also pertinent to point out is that the EMPA despite its vast number of 
parliamentarians - 260 in all - finds it difficult to attend to other conflicts other 
than the Arab-Israeli one such as those in Cyprus and the Western Sahara. 
Such an attitude towards the Cyprus Problem is strange because Cyprus is a 
member of the EU, part of its territory is illegally occupied by a candidate state 
to EU membership and a fully-fledged participant in the EMPA, and the 
reverberations from the conflict periodically produce seismic activity within the 
EU itself. 
Finally, beyond the scope of the current study, one cannot but ask the question 
of whether it is so because Cyprus is 'small meat' when compared to the more 
ominous challenges the Union faces? But one should be careful that even 
'smaller' problems (and their lack of a solution) can develop into bigger ones, 
especially for a Union that claims to be an international actor, 
38 Stavridis (2002), Mediterranean Politics, op. cit., p. 33. 
39 39 First session of the EMPAIPremiere session de I 'APEM (2005), op. cit., p. 64 (emphasis 
added). 
139 
STAVRIDIS & PACE 
4. Other related issues to parliamentary diplomacy and conflicts 
There are at least four other issues that are related to the topic under study in 
this chapter. For obvious space limitations, we will only refer to them rather 
briefly. These issues are as follows: parliamentary bodies as 'moral tribunes'; 
parliamentary input in election monitoring; the role of parliamentarians in the 
so-called 'socialization effect'; and, finally, the importance of sub-state 
parliamentary actors. 
'Moral tribunes' 
It is often argued that parliaments act as 'moral tribunes' on foreign policy. 
That is to say that because parliamentarians do not have to necessarily follow 
the official governmental line on international affairs, this allows them to be 
more 'flexible' (as noted above) and to adopt a more normative approach on 
foreign issues, They do not have to 'stick', as it were, to the official state 
diplomatic line on any given international issue. This makes sense also because 
in many cases the positions of parliamentary assemblies are not dictated by 
members of parliament of the governing majority but also include Opposition 
MPs who normally have divergent views from their governments, In addition, 
the position taken by some MPs often represents a particularly personal view. 
This is the view that Flavia Zenon has expressed about the reasons why she 
claims that the European Parliament and the EU states have divergent positions 
on many international issues: 
'Council foreign policy tends to reflect the sensitivities of Heads of 
State and Governments to economic and commercial matters, such 
Realpolitik concerns are of less interest for the representatives of the 
European peoples sitting in the European Parliament '40. 
Her point of view is not an isolated one. Several (French, British, Italian, 
Spanish, Greek, Luxembourg, Cypriot, Catalan) parliamentarians have 
repeatedly made this point on the international role of parliaments41, 
But there is also the overall question mark as to whether parliaments are really 
moral tribunes, or not. In some cases, they appear to be acting in the same 
40 Flavia Zenon, 'The European Parliament: an autonomous foreign policy identity?" in Barbe, 
Esther and Herranz, Anna (eds), The role of Parliaments in European foreign policy-Debating on 
accountability and legitimacy, Office of the European Parliament in Barcelona, Barcelona, 2005, 
Chapter 6: www.uab.es/iuee (accessed 21.10.05), no page given. 
41 see Stavridis (2002), Mediterranean Politics, op. cit., and his 'The international relations of the 
Cypriot Parliament', Jaurnal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol.5, No.3, December 2003, pp 
337-354, 'Towards a "European Solution" of the Cyprus Problem: False Promise or Real 
Opportunity?', The Cyprus Review, Vol. 18, No.1, Spring 2006, pp 87-119, The European Parliament 
and the Cyprus Problem: a preliminary - and critical - assessment, Institute of International 
Economic Relations Working Paper No. 24, Athens, July 2006: www.idec.gr/iier. 
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Realpolitik way as governments and states executives do. Thus, recent analyses 
of the EP stance on Cyprus and Turkey point to a strong dose of Realpolitik at 
the elCpense of moralitl2• 
When all is said and following careful analysis, it seems true that there is a 
higher dose of normative thinking in parliamentary diplomacy that is not 
present in traditional diplomacy. For instance, there has been a surge in the 
number of public apologies for past mistakes (slavery, colonization, genocides) 
but al50 a more active parliamentary involvement in difficult enquiries in issues 
dealing with ethnic cleansing or other past atrocities. Thus, both the French 
and the Dutch parliaments produced reports on the behaviour of their military 
forces with regards to the July 1995 massacres in Srebrenica. Le Monde called 
the report 'the conscience of the MPs' (29 November 2001). In the light of the 
report produced by the Dutch parliament, the Netherlands government resigned 
in the Spring of 2002, following the principle of collective Cabinet responsibility 
A similar claim could be made with regard to the way the European Parliament 
reacted to the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s. It adopted a more 'moralistic' stance 
than the other ECiEU institutions throughout the tragic and violent events in 
the region43 • Another similar case would be that of the EP during the many 
blood~ conflicts in Central America in the 1980s. Again, because of the way the 
two dominant political groupings (Socialists and Christian Democrats) interact in 
the Parliament in Strasbourg/Brussels, there appeared a much clearer 'human 
rights' policy towards that part of the world than in any of the other European 
institutions44 . 
Election monitoring 
As far as electoral monitoring in the Mediterranean is concerned, 
parliamentarians ought to play an important role. The European Parliament has 
been involved in a limited number of election monitoring missions in the 
Mediterranean: so far in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (2002), Lebanon (2005) 
and Palestine (1996, 2005, 2006). But the EMPA has not been directly involved 
in such initiatives. During a hearing of the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs 
Committee and Human Rights Subcommittee held on the 24 June 2005, it was 
42 see Stavridis (2006), Ibid.; Stelios Stavridis and Charalambos Tsardanidis, Charalambos, 'The 
Cyprus Problem in the European Parliament: a case of successful or superficial Europeanisation?', 
European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 14, No.1, Spring 2009, pp 129-156; see also Vaquer (2004), 
op.cit. 
43 see Stelios Stavridis, The European Parliament, European foreign policy and the conflict in 
former Yugoslavia 1991-1995, Unpublished Report to the European Commission, Brussels, Jean 
Monnet Chair Research Project No. 95/0549, Reading, December 1996. 
44 see Stelios Stavridis, "Foreign policy and democratic principles: the case of European Political 
Cooperation", Unpublished thesis, PhD in International Relations, Department of International 
Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, 1991, pp 248-
257, 
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argued that election monitoring was the first step towards democratisation; but 
that the obstacles in mounting them were many particularly because prior 
agreement was required of the governments of the states concerned before 
they could be carried out. 45 Democratisation was placed at the heart of the 
EMPA at its first meeting in Cairo in March 2005 and criticism of Egypt during 
the session coincided with the release of the Opposition leader Mr Ayman Nour, 
though pressure on Egypt in this case was also mounted by the USA. In a 
Resolution adopted in that first session of the Assembly, it was stated that the 
EMPA instructs its Political Committee on Security and Human Rights to monitor 
among other things, 'the strengthening of democratic processes in all the 
partner countries, particularly the sound organisation ot eiections,46. 
Socialization 
The 'socialization effect' is meant to work in such settings where democratic 
parties live together with undemocratic or partly democratic ones as is the case 
in the EMPA. Such institutional frameworks are meant to socialise over time 
their less democratic or experienced participants. Another argument is that by 
participating in these fora, members of democratically-elected parliaments are 
able to engage their 'counterparts' from non-democratic states. 
Of course, the debate is more complex. Southern Mediterranean MPs bring their 
own domestic politics into the workings of the EMPA - but do they take with 
them back home the lessons they learn there? Are they acting as MPs in the 
Western liberal sense of the word, possessing political ties with their parties 
back home but also enjoying some freedom of action and initiative? Or are they 
the parliamentary arms of governing elites using the EMPA to defend national 
positions in the same way as so many diplomats normally do within the UN 
General Assembly or other major diplomatic conferences. In short are they, for 
want of a better term, diplomats disguised as MPs? 
One should note nonetheless that parliamentarians from the developing 
countries themselves often express the wish to see their own national 
parliaments develop from 'rubber stamp' institutions into full-fledged 
legislative assemblies. To take an example from outside the Mediterranean 
context, speaking at a UN conference, MP Anne S. Makinda, Deputy Speaker of 
the Parliament of Tanzania, described the benefits of parliaments associating 
with parliaments of developed democratic countries thus: 
45 www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef~· I IEP I /TEXT +PRESS+NR·20050624· 
1 +O+DOC+XML+VOI lEN (accessed 15.08.08). 
46 Point 44, 'Resolution of the EMPA on the assessment of the Barcelona Process on the eve of its 
tenth anniversary, adopted on 15 March 2005 in Cairo (Egypt) on the basis of the resolution tabled 
by Mrs Tokia Sa"ifi, Chairperson, on behalf of the Committee on Political, Security and Human Rights 
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"it is important that parliaments and not only governments and 
international agencies be seen increasingly as actors in building 
South-South as well as North-South cooperation. We should not 
underestimate the importance of inter-parliamentary cooperation at 
the regional level, which in some cases is already bearing fruits. We 
need to help parliaments to learn from one another, compare 
experiences, and exchange information on best legislative practices 
and policies. Parliaments should also be seen increasingly as forums 
that can assist in peace-building and conflict resolution in those LDC 
countries that are either at risk of or are emerging from conflict. ,,47 
Of cou rse, regional parliamentary meetings, normally held in exotic settings by 
the host countries, could sometimes also lead to criticism of 'parliamentary 
tourism', but most observers and practitioners agree on their long-term 
beneficial impact on a wide range of ever increasing domains. Linked to this 
point, we should also mention that the European Union, and the EP in this case, 
try their best, for instance by insisting on some form of legitimisation for the 
Southern parliamentarians. They must be elected and can no longer be just 
representatives of their respecitve regimes (usually appointed diplomats) in 
order to be accepted as EMPA members. This practice began in the ACP 
Parliamentary Assembly48. No need to say that those regimes have invented 
ways of circumventing this hurdle, but it is yet another additional obstacle that 
they still need to overcome. 
Decentralization 
Decentralised cooperation between the two shores of the Mare Nostrum, and in 
particular among its parliamentarians, could and should also be promoted. Such 
a development would facilitate a better understanding of why the 'sacred' 
indivisibility of the state does not necessarily reflect the best form of 
democratic governance in the Z 1 st century. We should also note that the 
paradiplomacy involving sub-state regions is becoming more and more visible49 • 
Their parliaments are also becoming more active at the international level. This 
47 Statement by the Honourable Anne S. Makinda, Deputy Speaker of the Parliament of Tanzania on 
behalf of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the mid-
term review of the implementation of the Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries 
for the Decade 2001-2010, United Nations, New York, 18 September 2006. 
48 French Green MEP Alima Boumediene interview, in Stavridis (2002), Mediterranean Politics, pp. 
47-48. 
49 On paradiplomacy, see for instance Mario Kolling and Stelios Stavridis and Natividad Fernandez 
Sola (eds), Las relaciones internacionales de las regiones: actores sub-nacionales, para-diplomacia y 
gobernanza multinivel I The international relations of the regions: sub-national actors, para-
diplomacy and multi-level governance, Actas de Congreso/Conference Proceedings, Servicio de 
Publicaciones de la Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, 2007. 
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IS not the place to develop it further, but one could note that for instance some 
Spanish regions (comunidades autonomas) and their parliaments are becoming 
very active in the Mediterranean area 50. The 'Declaration by the regions and 
cities of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership on the occasion of the 10th 
anniversary of the signing of the Barcelona Declaration' that was issued in 
Barcelona on 26 November 2005 confirms that view. 51 Other organisations of 
European regions equally lamented that declarations on the Sarkozy initiative 
did not de facto' provide for the involvement of the regions in the re-launch of 
the Barcelona process', to quote from an Assembly of European Regions note 
published in June 2008,52 Positively, this hurdle has now been overcome. 
Associated to the above, one must also stress the link-role that parliaments play 
with civil society actors53 , the increasing role of 'municipalities' and especially 
that of 'big cities', in particular port-cities like Barcelona, Marseilles, Naples, 
Athens (Piraeus) to name but the Northern ones. 54 For instance, in the case of 
the French region PACA (Provences-Alpes-d' Azur-Cote-d' Azur), its 
paradiplomacy initiatives clearly refer to the Mediterranean space in all its 
multi-level dimensions. Thus, PACA President Michelle Vauzelle, in conjuction 
with the mayor of Marseille, Jean-Pierre Gaudin, organized the 22-23 June 2008 
Forum of Local and Regional Authories of the Mediterranean to reassert the 
need for renewed impetus to the Barcelona Process within the framework of the 
50 For the Catalan Parliament, Laura Brunet and Marti Grau and Stelios Stavridis, 'Los parlamentos 
regionales como acto res internacionales: el Parlament de Catalunya y el espacio 
euromediterrimeo', Cuadernos Constitucionales de la Ccitedra Fadrique Furia Ceriol, No. 47, Spring 
2004, pp 133-153. 
51 For a preliminary discussion of such a development see Helena Olivan and Pau Solanilla, Pau, 
'Las regiones y los poderes locales, nuevos acto res del Proceso de Barcelona', Afkarlldeas, IEMed, 
Barcelona, Summer 2005, pp 70·71. 
52 Contribution of the Assembly of European Regions to the "Barcelona Process: Union for the 
Mediterranean" in preparation for the summit on 13 July 2008, Adopted by the AER Bureau in 
Wroclaw on 11 June 2008: www.aer.eu. 
53 For an earlier assessment of the link between parliamentary cooperation and civil society, see 
Roderick Pace and Stelios Stavridis and Dimitris Xenakis, 'Parliaments and Civil Society Cooperation 
in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership', Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 15, No.1, Winter 2003/4 
(2004), pp 75·92. On civil society, see also Annette Junemann, 'The EuroMed Civil Forum: Critical 
"Watchdog" and Intercultural Mediator', Panebianco, Stefania (ed), A New Euro-Mediterranean 
Cultural Identity, Frank Cass, London, 2003, pp 84-107; Elisabeth Johansson·Nogues, Civil SOciety in 
Euro-Mediterranean relations: What success of EU's normative promotion?, EUI Working Paper 
RCAS No. 2006/40, Florence, December 2006; Helena Olivan, 'El balance del proceso de Barcelona y 
la encrucijada de la politica de vecindad: (Que instrumentos para la sociedad civil?', in Martinez 
Dalmau, Ruben (ed), Europa y el Mediterrcineo - Perspectivas del dicilogo euromediterrcineo, 
Publicaciones de la Universitat de Valencia and IMEE Barcelona, Valencia, pp 119·129, 2006). 
Without falling of course into the trap of mis-taking 'servile societies' for 'civil societies', to 
borrow from Carlos Chamorro, 'lSociedad civil 0 sociedad servil?', El Pais, 18 October 2008, 
54 See the Conclusions of the Valencia Seminar on "Cooperation at the local and regional level in 
the Euro·Mediterranean area" Tuesday 10 April 2007, Committee of the Regions, Brussels, CdR 
59/2007 fin EN/o, 23.04.2008. 
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Mediterranean Union. Vauzelle observed that relations between the regions and 
cities Df the Mediterranean were not simply characterised by "neighbourly 
relations" but genuinely by a "community of fate". Local and regional 
authonties attending the Forum adopted a final declaration inviting States to 
fulfil "their commitments and to step up the amount of public aid in the 
Mediterranean region. Moreover, they were urged to work together with local 
and regional authorities to afford this partnershi p greater effectiveness in the 
region~ as well as greater proximity vis-a.-vis their peoples55 • The November 
2008 !l\arseille Declaration makes reference to the establishment of a new 
regional programme to strengthen links between parliaments and civil society. 
Indeed, a decision has been taken to create an 'Assembly of elected 
representatives of the regions and local authorities in the "Union for the 
Mediterranean"'. For some time many Mediterranean sub-state regions had 
indeed been expressing an interest in becoming more involved in the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership. One of course will have to wait to see how actions 
under this programme will develop in the future before adding more comments 
on this initiative. 
Conclusions 
Although to date the record of the parliamentary impact on conflict resolution 
is not that promising, one should be careful not to throw the baby out with the 
bathwater. 
It remains clear that there is a lot of potential in employing parliamentary 
diplomacy for conflict resolution, provided that this potential is actually 
acknowledged and a conscious effort is made to use it. The main test of the 
efficacy (or otherwise) of parliamentary diplomacy in conflict resolution should 
not be the record so far, simply because if it has not been employed efficiently 
to date, then it is axiomatic that the results will not be the desired ones. 
Besides, parliamentary diplomacy is an activity which can produce results in the 
long term if it is vigorously pursued over time. One must also stress that it is a 
very recent phenomenon. Hence, it is not appropriate to compare its results 
with those of traditional diplomacy. Nor should one expect that parliamentary 
diplomacy alone can achieve what has not been achieved so far by the more 
traditional diplomatic methods in trying to resolve the Palestinian, Saharawi or 
Cypriot conflicts either. Indeed, parliamentary diplomacy must be seen as one 
of a number of mutually reinforCing activities in international relations aiming 
to bring parties to conflicts closer to one another by increasing mutual 
55 The Committee of the Regions was also invited to confer a formal position to local authorities in 
the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. For more on paradiplomacy and the Mediterranean see Stelios 
Stavridis and Romain Pasquier, "Linking levels": Re-examining the EU's Multi-level Paradiplomacy in a 
Globalized World", 3rd GARNET Annual Conference, Bordeaux, 17-20 September 2008. 
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understanding and access to one another, and by creating that environment of 
trust which is necessary to help diplomatic efforts. Hence, parliamentary 
diplomacy must be analysed and judged by (so far not fully articulated in the 
literature) its own set of criteria and objectives. For the time being, it is 
necessary to stress that in conflict situations, the stakes are too high, and that 
in such situations there is hardly any choice other than to keep on trying. 
Parliamentary cooperation can and should be used as often as possible. Our 
critique is that its main defect has been to date that it has not been used to its 
full potential in trying to resolve any of the Mediterranean Region's long 
standing conflicts. 
fhe potential 'bridge-making' role of parliamentary diplomacy in conflict 
resolution should not be under-estimated. It is therefore surprising that a 
recent study on 'Conflict Prevention in the EMP' does not even mention once 
the potential and actual role that parliaments can play in that area56 • It is 
equally relevant to our study that the same EUROMESCO Paper does not make a 
single reference to the Cyprus Conflict. We do not expand on the possible 
reasons for such an omission but we think any independent-minded observer 
would note the irony that the EUROMESO "experts" survey did not include 
anyone from either Greece or Cyprus, though perhaps not surprisingly (sic) one 
from Turkey was included. 
It is also clear that the EMPA as a parliamentary assembly should primarily 
become involved in political issues which are central to the peace and stability 
of the Mediterranean Region and to the EU itself. It must not be allowed to be 
distracted from the main issues by venting its otherwise unused energy on 
topics which may be important in the long-term but which contribute very little 
to the enhancement of stability in the region. Democratisation will not occur by 
itself. The numerous conflicts that exist in the region must be resolved. In this 
context, though the EMPA started as the parliamentary dimension of the EMP 
and ought to remain there, it does not imply that it must stick to the EMP 
agenda. The EMP was originally started to help bring about peace, security and 
a shared prosperity in the Mediterranean region; the Middle East problem and 
the other conflicts of the region (Cyprus and the Western Sahara) are the 
problems to be tackled, not the ones to run away from. 
As long as the main destabilising conflicts such as the Middle East, Cyprus and 
Western Sahara, often and misleadingly labelled the "frozen conflicts,,57, persist 
it is hard to achieve progress on the 'softer' issues; linkage politics - whether 
56 Euromesco, Conflict Prevention in the EMP, Euromesco Paper No. 64 (Roberto Aliboni, Yasar 
Qatarneh), September 2007: www.euromesco.net. 
57 One can but only refer to the other so-called "frozen" conflict, like the one in Georgia which this 
summer of 2008 went 'hot' at a "micro-wave oven" speed, to keep with the analogy, 
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subtle (covert) or open (overt) - connects the two. This is because states 
continue to link progress in one area to progress in the other. All the conflicts 
analysed here have at one time or another been blamed for the lack of progress 
in re!lional co-operation of various types even when such co-operation was 
considered to be of a functional, non-political nature or better still was 
perceived as a sort of longer-term confidence building process that could lead 
to positive spillover into the political domain. For example, the Western Sahara 
issue has stifled economic integration in the Maghreb, notwithstanding that the 
economic welfare gains that would accrue to all the participating states are 
such as to make the case for establishing the union a seemingly full proof one. 
Similarly, a solution to the Cyprus Problem (another case of justice delayed) 
will benefit all the people in that island, remove a cause of internal turbulence 
from within the EU, and finally might bring Turkey closer to its own accession 
ambitions. 58 As for the 'mother of all conflicts', the Israeli-Arab one, any 
solution will stop the regional arms race, unblock possibly the way to long-
awaited reforms in the Arab world, and steal some fire from terrorist 
organ isations. 
What seems to be essential is that in regional parliamentary initiatives such as 
the EJAPA, participants are constantly reminded of the need to maintain their 
focus on the objectives of such initiative in conflict resolution. It is sad that 
often many national delegations behave just as the extension of their countries' 
diplomatic service often turning EMPA meetings into arenas for scoring 
propaganda points or for trying to influence the world views of European 
parliamentarians. It is time to call the parliamentarians to order and convince 
them to focus more radically on dialogue. 
The absence of pluralistic democracies in the south where parties and members 
of parliament need to maintain contact with constituencies and voters to stand 
any chance of re-election is already a serious handicap. The lack of pressure to 
be accountable to voters leaves southern politicians free from any constraint to 
produce results. In addition there is the problem of the visibility of the EMP and 
EMPA itself, the interest shown in them by the public and media. As long as 
both the EMP and the EMPA are not in the vortex of the public and media 
interest, what happens in them and what the various participants do in them 
(including parliamentarians) will remain irrelevant and isolated, taking place in 
a bubble separated from the rest of the world. But should the EMPA become 
58 We say 'possibly' because there are plenty of other obstacles to Turkey's road to EU 
membership, see Aylin Gliney, 'The Politics of Turkey's Accession Process to the European Union', 
in Stavridis, Stelios (ed), Understanding and Evaluating the European Union: theoretical and 
empirical approaches, Nicosia University Press, Nicosia (2009, in press), On the question of a 'case 
of justice delayed', see inter alia Costas Melakopides, 'The legal and moral grounds for Europe's 
obligation to end the occupation of northern Cyprus', in Ibid, 
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more forthcoming and pro-active on many issues, including conflict resolution, 
then the publics everywhere will become interested in it and what their 
parliamentarians are doing or not doing, given that there is near universal 
desire that existing conflicts ought to be resolved once and for all. The guiding 
star is simple and unproblematic: give the parliamentary assembly a credible, 
important role in conflict resolution and the public will focus on it thereby 
increasing its relevance and effectiveness. Allow it to languish in the desert of 
irrelevance and trivia, and the public will disregard it thereby devaluing it 
further as an effective political force for good. 
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